and Fourteenth Amendments, and the common-law
privilege of presence. See also State v. Hudson, 119 N.J.
165 (1990); State v. Fann, 239 N.J. Super. 507 (Law Div.
1990).
State v. Corpi, 297 N.J. Super. 86 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 149 N.J. 407 (1997), held conditional plea
agreement whereby prosecutor agreed to lower
recommended custodial exposure if defendant paid
restitution to victims under all counts did not deny
defendant due process, though defendant contended he
received greater sentence because of his nonpayment of
restitution, where it was defendant who first advanced
idea of restitution, he acknowledged at retraxit
proceeding that greater sentence could be imposed
absent restitution, and possibility of restitution never
matured to point that it could be considered at
sentencing.
In State v. Marshall III, 148 N.J. 89, cert. denied, 522
U.S. 850 (1997), refusal of law enforcement personnel to
be interviewed by defense counsel seeking evidence to
support murder defendant’s post-conviction relief (PCR)
claims did not violate defendant’s rights to due process,
confrontation of witnesses, or fair PCR hearing.
State v. Marsh, 290 N.J. Super. 663 (App. Div. 1996)
decided that the due process clause did not require that
State fulfill police officer’s promise to dismiss drunk
driving summons if driver cooperated in unrelated drug
investigation, even if driver detrimentally relied on
promise by cooperating in investigation; defendant
suffered no constitutional or legal prejudice with regard
to his pending trial as consequence of municipal
prosecutor’s refusal to carry out officer’s promise. See also
State v. Riley, 242 N.J. Super. 113 (App. Div. 1990) (Due
process requires that government fulfill its immunity
agreements when defendant relies on agreement to his
detriment and cooperates with government).
In State In the Interest of J.G., 151 N.J. 565 (1997),
the Court upheld the constitutionality of N.J.S.A.
2A:4A-43.1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2.2, involving the
testing for AIDS and HIV of defendants charged with
aggravated sexual assault and sexual assault. An exception
to the Warrant Clause of Fourth Amendment may apply
when “special needs,” beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
requirement impracticable, and though generally there
must be some showing of individualized suspicion, in
appropriate cases even this requirement may be
unnecessary where special needs are found. Applying the
special needs analysis to this situation, the Court held
that the testing of accused or convicted sex offenders for
HIV are warranted by special circumstances. Prior to
testing, there must be a showing of probable cause to
believe that there had been a possible transfer of bodily
fluids. Further, the test results may not be used against
an accused sex offender in a criminal prosecution. With
those procedural safeguards, the statutes do not violate a
defendant’s due process rights.In State v. Robinson, 289 N.J. Super. 447 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 146 N.J. 497 (1996), the trial court’s
failure to define specific offense defendant intended to
commit after he entered building did not violate
defendant’s due process rights so as to constitute plain
error in burglary prosecution in which defense essentially
asserted misidentification of perpetrator, absent any
reasonable basis upon which jury might have convicted
defendant for entering dwelling with purpose to engage
in lawful activity; defendant was observed late at night,
hanging out of window in dwelling that had been forced
open, and was stranger to dwelling’s occupants.State v. Damon, 286 N.J. Super. 492 (App. Div.
1996) held requiring defendant to remain handcuffed in
presence of jury denied defendant his right to fair trial, in
violation of due process, even though there was a shortage
of security personnel during trial, and even though jury
later heard testimony that defendant was incarcerated.In State v. Abronski, 281 N.J. Super. 390 (App. Div.
1995), certif. denied, 145 N.J. 265 (1996), defendant was
not deprived of due process, even though court
stenographer lost notes of one day of suppression hearing
regarding defendant’s inculpatory statements, where
defendant did not claim prejudice from loss of his or
witness’ testimony, but claimed prejudice as a result of
trial judge’s findings. See also State v. Izaguirre, 272 N.J.
Super. 51 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 167 (1994)
(Loss of stenographic notes of entire trial did not violate
due process, where record was promptly reconstructed).In Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), arrestee’s
incarceration, following his arrest pursuant to warrant
subsequently found to have been obtained without
probable cause, did not violate his substantive due
process rights; violation, if any, implicated Fourth
Amendment.Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993). Totality
of circumstances approach is used when addressing claim
that introduction of involuntary confession has violated
due process. See also State v. Jackson, 272 N.J. Super. 543
(App. Div. 1994), certif. denied, 138 N.J. 265 (1995).