The Economist November 20th 2021 UnitedStates 47
and Reinvestment Act (arra). Will voters
be madly grateful?
Probably not. “Economic populism,” as
Democratic Party staffers and strategists
call the tactic, may be more white whale
than silver bullet. Our analysis of US House
election results in 2008 and 2012 reveals
that the party did not do any better in coun
ties that saw higher perperson arra
funds than in those that saw less.
We looked at the change in the Demo
crats’ share of votes cast in competitive
House races, weighing arrafunding per
person in each county against the Demo
crats’ share of the vote in that county in
2008, the percentage of white, noncol
legeeducated voters living there, the num
ber of people per square mile, the unem
ployment rate in 2008 and a few other fac
tors. After adjusting for these, arrafund
ing had no effect on the party’s
performance. Our model found the Demo
crats lost 7.7 percentage points of the vote
in the average county in the bottom 10% for
arrafunding, versus 7.9 points for coun
ties in the top 10%. That difference was not
statistically significant.
The findings are controversial. Past
studies about the effects of the arrahave
found small positive effects for the Demo
crats’ vote share—with an interesting
twist. The leading study was done by Kath
erine Levine Einstein, a Boston University
political scientist, in conjunction with
KrisStella Trump, now a political science
professor at the University of Memphis,
and Vanessa Williamson, a researcher at
Brookings. The Economist’s model was
nearly identical to theirs, but they found
that funding went with a higher Democrat
ic voteshare if that county already had ve
ry high levels of support for Democratic
House candidates. But in very Republican
places, they found the Recovery and Rein
vestment Act funds actually hurt Demo
crats by up to 5 percentage points.
The difference comes down to which
counties and which variables are included
in the analysis. Because of the way arra
funds were doled out, state capitals were
often used as receptacles for money that
would be distributed to counties later. This
created an artificially high reading of per
person arrafunds. Then, some of these
counties just so happened to move less to
wards Republicans between 2008 and 2012,
perhaps because they were large cities that
tended to vote Democratic. This in turn
produced an inflated estimate of the pre
cise amount by which stimulus funds
helped Democrats.
The academic model also did not adjust
for population density in counties; or the
share of white voters without degrees
(both of which were linked to Republican
gains during Barack Obama’s first term in
office); or the possibility that all counties
represented by Democratic legislators
wouldhaveseenmorebacklashbecause
DemocratsheldtheWhiteHouse.Inour
model, countiesthatelectedDemocratic
Housemembersin 2008 sawtheparty’s
votesharedropbyfivepointsmorethan
thosewithRepublicanmembers.Thatef
fectwaslargerthanforthearra—nomat
terwhatothervariableswecontrolledfor.
ProgressiveDemocratshavefordecades
believedthattheirpopularpolicypropos
als and economic redistribution would
winthemmorevotersovertime.Butthe
biggestinfrastructurespendingplanofthe
past 50 yearsdidnotconferanysuchbene
fitsonthem.Perhapsthistimewillbedif
ferent.Butit seemsunlikely.n
Healthcare
Drug deals
M
ostdiabeticsneedatleastoneshot
of insulin a day to regulate their
bloodsugarlevels.Someneedfour,andin
America, drug companies charge about
$100a vial—nearlyseventimesmorethan
inanyotheroecdcountry.OlderAmeri
cans,a thirdofwhomlivewithdiabetes,
could soonpayaslittleas$35 amonth
thankstoa billthattheDemocratsaretry
ingtofasttrackthroughCongress,much
tothedismayofthepharmaceuticalindus
try,whicharguesthatthecostcapswill
damageinnovation.
PrescriptiondrugsinAmericacosttwo
anda halftimesmoreonaveragethanin
otherdevelopedcountries.Atthemoment
thefederalgovernmentcannotnegotiate
withpharmafirmsoverthepricesofthe
drugstheysell,asothercountriesdo.In
Britain,forexample,thenhsnegotiates
discounted prices with pharmaceutical
companies, andonlyafteranotherpublic
bodyhasdeterminedifa drugisbeneficial
enoughto justify theprice.In America,
pharmaceuticalcompaniesare,ineffect,
thepricemakers.Ifpassed,thisbillwould
allowthegovernmenttohavesomesayin
drugpricesforthefirsttime.
OnbehalfofMedicarepatients(those
aged 65 orolderandthedisabled),thebill
couldempowerthehealthsecretarytone
gotiatelowerpricesfortenofthecostliest
drugsby 2025 and 20 by 2028.Thisin
cludestreatmentstypicallygiveninhospi
tals,suchascancerdrugswhichcancost
payers$20,000a dose,andalsoprescrip
tiondrugstakenathome.Theplanwould
alsoensurethatthesepatientsdon’tspend
morethan$2,000oftheirownmoneyon
medicineeachyear,adesirabledevelop
mentsinceanestimated18mAmericans
can’taffordthedrugsthattheyneed.
This is, unsurprisingly, not popular
withthepharmaceuticalindustry. Many
newdrugsdevelopedtodayrelyonven
turecapitalinvestmentsinsmallbiotech
firmstocarryoutriskyresearch.Investors
areincentivisedbythepromiseofsubstan
tialreturns,sinceAmerica’spharmaceuti
calbehemothseventuallysellthesedrugs
athighprices.TheplanbeforeCongressal
socurbspharmaceuticalsfromincreasing
someoftheirdrugpricesmorethanthe
rateofinflation eachyear.This sounds
goodforconsumers,butphrma, thein
dustry’s lobbying group, maintains that
thisbillwillupendAmerica’s“globallead
ershipinbiomedicalinnovation”.Willit?
Althoughhighpricescansubsidisere
search,thebillhasbeentweakedtoreduce
theimpactonnewdrugs.TheDemocrats’
previousproposalwouldhaveintroduced
pricenegotiationsandinflationcapsfor
250 drugs, for everyone. Had this been
madelaw,thenonpartisanCongressional
BudgetOfficeestimatedthateightfewer
drugswouldhavebeenbroughttomarket
overa decade(whichiseithera littleora
lot,depending onyourmedical progno
sis).Butinthecurrentplan,onlytenofthe
costliestdrugswillbeaffectedatfirstby
inflationcaps.Whatismore,thesecaps
willapplyonlyafterthedrugshavebeen
onthemarketfora while:nineyearsfor
cheapersmallmoleculedrugsand 12 years
forthemorecomplexbiologics.
Pharmaceuticalsandtheirinvestorsof
ten make their money back, and then
some,muchfasterthanthis.TakeGilead
Sciences,forexample,whichboughtthe
biotechPharmasset—andtheirHepatitisc
drug,Sovaldi—for$11.2bnin2011.Gilead
recoupedalmostallofthatin 2014 alone.
Inshort,thebillstrikesa balancethatmin
imisesinnovationriskswhilestillgrant
ingthegovernment somemuchneeded
negotiatingpower. Even therepresenta
tivesmostcriticalofdrugpricingreforms,
suchasSenatorKyrstenSinema,seemto
havecomearound.n
WilltheDemocrats’proposalsondrug
pricingdamageinnovation?
Insulin shock
Average price per standard unit of insulin, 2018, $
Source:“Comparing insulin prices in the United States
toothercountries”, Andrew Mulcahy et al.
*Excluding United States
Britain
OECD average*
France
Germany
Canada
Japan
United States
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