Migration scenarios: turkey, egypt and Morocco 271
Between 2015 and 2019, not only will the oil reserves be drying up, but
Egypt, with its limited gas reserves (which, for the most part, lie offshore),
will also no longer be able to compete on the world gas market. Nega-
tive growth of GDP between 2019 and 2023 is the result since, apart from
internal problems, Egypt will now have to import oil, which will, in turn,
exacerbate the need for foreign currency. The reduction of subsidies for
energy will lead to a decrease in industrial production. The permanent
crisis in agriculture, however, will mean retaining the subsidies for im-
ported grain in order to secure a basic supply of foodstuffs, consequently
increasing the national debt. On the job market, these developments cause
the labour-force participation rate to fall from 49.5 per cent to 43 per cent
in the years 2012 to 2030.
Toward the end of the decade, the World Bank and the IMF intervene
and impose a radical programme for structural reforms as a condition for
granting Egypt the credit needed to prevent national bankruptcy. This
succeeds in stabilising the situation and creating new growth by 2025. But
the high level of imports and debt payments causes the GNI to stagnate.
On the job market, the low level of employment in the formal sector fails
to increase, a result of both the structural reforms and the parallel increase
in the working-age population.
This scenario clearly shows that negative dynamics increase the emi-
gration potential up until 2030 to more than 690,000 persons. And if we
disregard the network factor, the increase is even higher. Should the EU
adopt a liberal stance toward immigration or should it no longer be in a
position to control immigration, this would, indeed, cause Egypt to be a
very important source of immigration to the EU.
Early reforms despite economic and political setbacks (scenario 3)
The third scenario is based on extending the recent development in
growth rates through to 2015. The Egyptian government presses on
with the policy of opening up the Egyptian market in order to entice
foreign investments. In light of the dwindling supply of natural resources,
particularly of crude oil, it will also invest in education by improving
the infrastructure and participation rates, in particular of women. In
addition, the government will restructure the tertiary level of education
and improve training in both technical and scientif ic courses of study to
overcome the existing mismatch between market needs and educational
means.
From 2020, the depletion of oil reserves begins to affect the growth rate.
Even if Egypt’s position on the gas market could be maintained, it would