The Philosophy of Psychology
be the position adopted by Sperberet al., 1995a.) Or alternatively, those processes may all be connectionist ones, as Evans and ...
These principles may seem reasonable enough, until one realises that compliance with them would be – to say the least – very tim ...
be appropriate epistemic practice, if the realist’s approach is correct. For if scientiWc theorising is driven, not just by a co ...
6 Content for psychology In this chapter we review, and contribute to, the intense debate which has raged concerning the appropr ...
and those truth-conditions will standardly involve worldly items and states of aVairs. Equally, a narrow-content theorist should ...
say that the thought, ‘I am cold’ has the same sense (the same narrow content) for each one of us. But those senses areaboutdiVe ...
same. Conclusion: the contents of thoughts about natural kinds (and the meanings of sentences referring to natural kinds) depend ...
The problem for Russell’s account is that it is too austere to do all the work that we need a notion of thought to perform. In p ...
according to which one means by ‘water’ (say) something like: ‘StuVwhich is the same asthisin its basic composition’. So the mos ...
rather than thought-tokenswhich are the primary bearers of truth-values. For recall that narrow-content theorists do not deny th ...
could ever doubt whetherthatcat is causingtheseexperiences (that is, the experiences which now ground my demonstrative reference ...
when anchored in the context of Tiddles has the truth-condition,Tiddles is dangerous, and when anchored in the context of Twiddl ...
caused by one and the same person, then they have the same truth- condition. Bad news for Fodor, we say. Carruthers’ (1987a) pro ...
have truth-conditions, and are not, in themselves,aboutanything. And it makes no sense to ask whether a narrow content, as such, ...
even if we cannot predict what they willinfer, we can still predict and explain some of theiractionson the basis of such a descr ...
reference of that term, in our mouths, is of course tied to the constitution of the stuVon Earth. There is, surely, nothing of d ...
which admits of a rationalising (that is, content-involving) explanation. For how can an action which is not done for a reason ( ...
The only other option, for the Russellian, is to claim that it is not really thoughts, but ratherthought-signs(sentences, or sen ...
containing a colourless liquid, and that each thinks a thought they would express with the words, ‘There is still some water lef ...
dividuated, then so too will a person’s intentions be; and then so will their intentional behaviour. A similar point holds in co ...
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