The Philosophy of Psychology

to, or provide an account of, such lower-level processes, before we can believe in the reality of the psychological. We just hav ...

realisability. The idea seems to be that although we cannot be required to provide natural conditions which arenecessaryfor a gi ...

intentional properties, nor even a set ofsuYcientconditions for intentional content, but rather a set ofnecessaryconditions. The ...

8 Forms of representation Over the last two chapters we have been considering the nature of psycho- logical content. In the pres ...

thoughts. But the second – semantic – part of the claim is deWnitely incorrect, as we will now brieXy argue. Images, of themselv ...

called ‘thinking’. Sometimes, surely, our thoughts can consist in a mixture of sentences and mental images. Thus, when reasoning ...

unequivocally propositional, reserving judgement on whether imagistic thinking, too, is covertly propositional in form. 2 Mental ...

2.1 The case for Mentalese The classical solution to these three problems has been that beliefs are relations to internal senten ...

capable of entertaining some thoughts, then they will also be capable of entertaining structurally related thoughts? Horgan and ...

in terms of Marr’s (1982) three levels of analysis:Wrst there is the (top) functionallevel, at which mental-state transitions ar ...

cells, responding diVerentially to particular features, such as the presence of a colour, or an upright line in a particular reg ...

way that only connectionist models can explain. Now, it may be that a little tampering with the hidden nodes within a network wi ...

one of these domains requires an implausibly high number of training runs, or an implausible degree of structure imposed upon th ...

committed to anything about the inner organisation of the box, or could it just as well be a distributed connectionist network? ...

one would maintain that it is a distinctively connectionist architecture, rather than a connectionist implementation of a system ...

ment to causal systematicity seems rather to derive from our folk-belief in systematic inference. While we doubt whether there i ...

they can nevertheless be thought of as conceptual components of the output. So connectionists sometimes claim that they can acco ...

And even if an activation-cluster remains suYciently stable to support some generalisation linking patterns of activation with o ...

which Horgan and Tienson oVer in support of non-algorithmic processing (following Putnam, 1988) is unsound. Horgan and Tienson p ...

dividual thinkers. Science is, of course, a collective and inter-subjective enterprise. New empirical results and new theories a ...