The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion

for it asserts that if God does not exist, He is one. On such views, “there is” in “there is something with all perfections whic ...

One can read Descartes' Meditation III argument about the concept of God as an attempt to warrant (21a). It is, in effect, an ar ...

would be F. But apart from this, it also sets up the claim that (27) and (29) concern some entity or truth independent of the mi ...

One can put Caterus's thought this way: from premises about the content of a concept, only conclusions about the content of a co ...

has an instance—and so here we do not escape the conceptual order. The Pegasus argument from perfection, Descartes might say, fa ...

and do colors pose a problem for the argument? Can the argument be parodied? And what about the gap between consistency and meta ...

Parody and Possibility Leibniz's argument does seem vulnerable to parody (Adams 1994, 150–51). Nothing he says indicates that hi ...

Kant supports (34) with only an example, that “necessarily a triangle has three sides” is really “necessarily, for all x, if x i ...

Gödel Kant actually said little that earlier writers had not already said, and Kant's objections (I've claimed) were duds. But t ...

Axioms 1 and 2 jointly entail that any positive property is consistent. For a property is inconsistent just in case it entails i ...

they do necessarily. As to Axiom 5, necessary existence is certainly compatible with perfection, and perfect being reasoning sug ...

NOTES 1.Leibniz's argument, for instance, reasons simply from the claim that God is a necessary being (see below). But the latte ...

8.To see the need for Brouwer, suppose (contra Brouwer) that relative possibility is not symmetric. Then there could be worlds l ...

Findlay, J. N. 1955. “Can God's Existence Be Disproved?” In New Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. Antony Flew and Alasdair M ...

Forgie, William. 1991. “The Modal Ontological Argument and the Necessary A Posteriori.” International Journal for Philosophy of ...

Oppenheimer, Paul, and Edward Zalta. 1991. “On the Logic of the Ontological Argument.” In Philosophical Perspectives V, ed. Jame ...

not existing, with a necessary being not having the possibility of not existing. The arguments differ with respect to the type o ...

arguments do not induce but instead deduce from the fact reporting some occurrence of natural design that there is a supernatura ...

One reason that might be given for the impossibility of an actual infinite regress of simultaneous causes or movers is that if t ...

cause this being to come into being out of nothing. But why couldn't this cause be itself a contingent being and it, in turn, be ...