Free Will A Contemporary Introduction

226 Mesh, Reasons-Responsive, Leeway Theories of the following form. Suppose that the sea is very cold, and Brown knows it, and ...

Mesh, Reasons-Responsive, Leeway Theories 227 by something close to a conditional specification after all. So suppose that an ag ...

228 Mesh, Reasons-Responsive, Leeway Theories Suggestions for Further Reading As with the previous chapter, we have covered a lo ...

Mesh, Reasons-Responsive, Leeway Theories 229 Russell, Paul. 2002a. “Critical Notice of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza Res ...

230 Mesh, Reasons-Responsive, Leeway Theories two most often quoted paragraphs in his “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a ...

Mesh, Reasons-Responsive, Leeway Theories 231 20 There are two other philosophers who began to advance accounts of this sort abo ...

10 Contemporary Incompatibilism Libertarianism According to libertarian views, we human beings have the ability to act freely in ...

Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism 233 proponent of this sort of position. In his view, although actions occur in time ...

234 Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism The view does not involve any sort of irreducible agent causation, but it does ...

Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism 235 To illustrate his account, and to facilitate objections, Balaguer sets out his ...

236 Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism probability that it will penetrate, but not certainty, because its position and ...

Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism 237 have sufficient connection with the agent for her to be morally responsible for ...

238 Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism component in Ralph’s neural processes. The position the dial lands on thus make ...

Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism 239 what would dissolve the responsibility- undermining luck that the scenario invo ...

240 Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism this scenario, we procure as much authorship and control for Ralph as we can, g ...

Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism 241 could have the required leeway for alternative actions. For Kane the second com ...

242 Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism mistake or accident, without being coerced or compelled in doing so, or otherwi ...

Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism 243 rational explanation. But the luck objection can be raised here as well. Imagin ...

244 Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism 10.7. Agent- Causal Libertarianism and Luck Objections Suppose an agent is deli ...

Contemporary Incompatibilism: Libertarianism 245 Meghan Griffith (2005) employs an epistemic analogue of this line of reason- in ...