The Philosophy of Psychology

deep philosophical diYculties lurking here. But to say of an organism that it is consciousof such-and-such(transitive) is normal ...

which it is so conscious is not itself a conscious one! We think it best to by-pass all danger of confusion here by avoiding the ...

particular pattern of neuralWring) possessphenomenal properties? There is something distinctive that a conscious experience, or ...

Self-consciousness admits of both weaker and stronger varieties, where each is a dispositional property of the agent. In the wea ...

which deserve to be classed as examples of non-conscious perception. For there are, in addition, many cases in which, while cont ...

some degree, but apparently without consciousness. And Block (1995) describes cases of epileptics who continue their activities ...

2 Mysterianism In this section we review all the major arguments which have been presen- ted in defence ofmysterianism– the doct ...

concepts, and modes of presentation of those facts). In addition to the facts concerning the spatial layout of objects in my oYc ...

black-and-white room. At the point where he takes up the story, Mary has never had any experience of colour; but, we may suppose ...

It may be objected that Mary surely does acquire some new proposi- tional knowledge on her release from the room (Loar, 1990). F ...

their home domain; or provided that in addition to these mechanisms we also have somegeneral-purpose learning-mechanisms (and su ...

nature can be physical, if you try to jump over too many intermediate stages at once. For example, it can easily seem mysterious ...

every last microscopic particle in the universe has beenWxed, there is simply noroomfor any further variation (except by conserv ...

then we cannot be conceptualising the latter in terms of functions. Rather our concepts, here, are presumably barerecognitionalo ...

which need go unexplained. For even this freedom to conceptualise can itselfbe explained on such an account, as we shall see. So ...

Figure 9.1 A case of inverted phenomenology 2.5 Real inversions? Unfortunately for the above line of reply to Chalmers, there ar ...

such a deviant one that we have no good reason to rely upon the subject’s memory-reports at stage (2) – see Dennett, 1988b. If w ...

also be individuatednarrowly, in abstraction from the actual objects and properties of the thinker’s environment, particularly w ...

2.6 Are there any non-representational properties of experience? Those who think that the existence of phenomenal consciousness ...

your perceptual state comes down to paying close attention to the quality of the worldrepresented(while being aware of itasrepre ...