The Philosophy of Psychology
Figure 9.2 The tree of consciousness theories propose that phenomenal consciousness may be identiWed with syn- chronised 35- to ...
demonstrated (for instance, by galvanic skin responses) to be taking place at some level. But no attempt is made at explainingwh ...
Figure 9.3 First-order representationalism experience than having a certain sort of representational content poised and accessib ...
has to chew on pretty hard to force himself to swallow. Tye, on the other hand, believes that he is better oVin relation to this ...
Kirk (1994) apparently exempliWes theWrst approach, claiming that for a perceptual state with a given content to be phenomenally ...
This point prompts us to raise another – closely related – general diYculty for suchWrst-order accounts, which is that they cann ...
depends upon the way properties of the world are made available to the subject, grounded in properties of the subject’s perceptu ...
will be capable of recognising the fact that it has an experienceas of red, say, in just the same direct, non-inferential, way t ...
that we humans are in fact capable of HORs. They can then claim that FOR-theory gives the truth about phenomenal consciousness, ...
a creature to entertain the HOT, ‘I am perceiving a green surface’, then probably few other creatures, if any, would qualify as ...
Taking this second option would move us, in eVect, to ahigher-order experience(HOE) account of consciousness. Just such a view h ...
idea that any organism capable of mental-state-consciousness would need to possessconceptsof experience, and so be capable of hi ...
In reply, we may allow that thecontentsof the two sets of experiences are very likely identical; the diVerence being that the ex ...
experience (HOE, or ‘inner sense’) theories, on the one hand, and higher- order thought (HOT) theories, on the other. The main p ...
developmental account of our mind-reading abilities provided by Gold- man (1993) and some other simulationists. The claim is tha ...
actual presence of a HOT targeted on the state in question – anddis- positionalistforms, which explain phenomenal consciousness ...
Figure 9.4 Dispositionalist HOT-theory ‘conscious’ – whose function is,inter alia, to make its contents available to HOT. SeeWgu ...
practical reasoning systems. (For example, see Baars’ vigorous defence of the idea of aglobal workspace– 1988, 1997.) Then add t ...
faculty to the outputs of our perceptual systems completely transforms the contents which they carry. 3.8 HOD-theory Dennett (19 ...
information should only coalesce in response to top-down probing of the contents of experience. (‘Am I seeing someone in red to ...
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