The Fragmentation of Being
Here is a suggestion that seems to do the trick.^22 Corresponding to the present moment is a unique way of being. Additionally, ...
are much older than two days old! Insofar as there is a feeling of“difference in reality,”their births seem more real, more pres ...
opposed to a mere seeming?^26 A related concern is that memory provides us with knowledge by acquaintance rather than knowledge ...
the truth-maker for the proposition that World War I was horrific. But there seems to be nothing in the presentist’s ontology to ...
To make sure that this appearance is not deceptive, we need to think about how the ontological pluralist should formulate the tr ...
so forth for other truths about the past. PEP does not face the truth-making objection that devastates presentism, despite the f ...
centrism, there are past and future objects, but they have virtually none of the interesting properties that presently existing ...
with respect to their categorical properties, but only a few of them are such that they were horrific wars or mountains.^43 Cons ...
object was C, ungrounded in any further fact stateable without appeal to a tense- operator. According to PEP, what makes it the ...
claim is also grounded. However, if a putative truth is determined by neither the laws of essence nor the laws of nature in conj ...
presentism overlap while those of PEP do not. But now we are considering a view in which there is overlap. Why not go all the wa ...
inclined to do. Despite the protestations of some philosophers, there isn’t much to be said in favor of absolutely unrestricted ...
nicely with PEP. PEP recognizes a plurality of ways to be, and adverbialism recog- nizes a plurality of ways to have a property. ...
Regardless of whether Solomyak’s view about modality is correct, the analogous view about time is very compelling. There is a pr ...
are simulated via what is at the ground-floor level, namely, the fundamental differ- ence in mode of being. Ontological pluralis ...
According toacceptance, in general, we don’t know that we are present. But this is a claim we can accept, because it is not a pr ...
us by way of ordinary sense perception are presented to us as being present (and as being actual).^64 But sense perception is no ...
The easy knowledge response is suggested by the following remarks from Bricker (2001: 30), which appear in the context of his re ...
perhaps most ordinary people, whether past or present, lack particularly good evidence that they are present. Ifind this upshot ...
The notion of a fundamental ontological kind is not indexical; nor are the fundamental kinds themselves. Bricker draws a helpful ...
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