The Fragmentation of Being
perfectly natural properties that do not supervene on other perfectly natural prop- erties is enjoyed by beings by courtesy. I t ...
of accounting for the deficiency of the mode of being of almost nothings before settling on the claim that almost nothings have ...
6. Persons and Value 6.1 Introduction I exist and so do you. But in what way (or ways) do we exist? And do we exist to the fulle ...
But before we dive into the question of our ontological status, let us consider why we should care to dip into these waters at a ...
contemplation. Suárez’s resolution of this dilemma presupposes that we are not beings of reason—God after all does cognize us. O ...
The idea that the direction of our cognition should be towards the fundamental still informs contemporary metaphysics. Sider (20 ...
employs the notions of correctness to whole propositional attitudes such as desires, preferences, and beliefs. I suggest that we ...
might disagree on whether anything has the latter kind.^14 But the dominant view is that we do not.^15 There are also strands of ...
Unfortunately, in the previous chapter, I argued from the premise that shadows, holes, cracks, and other entities that I called“ ...
Thefirst strategy is via arguing for a kind of idealistic metaphysic on which everything is a person, or is at least intimately ...
ifit is a being who enjoys intentional states, who is capable of language use, who has social interactions with other Daseins, a ...
natural properties, then persons are fully real. In what follows, I’ll presuppose the principle and focus on whether persons enj ...
is always the sum of the masses of its parts.) That said, as noted in section 2.2, I think that all determinates of a given dete ...
what follows, I will focus not on emergentcausal powers but rather on emergent properties.^29 What could those novel properties ...
Here is one place where considerations of how things persist, and specifically how personspersist, come into play. Let me say at ...
each of us has an original feeling of selfhood from which our idea of selfhood derives. Unfortunately, Home thought that this or ...
have a good reason to think that certain temporal parts are fully real, and perhaps we have a good reason to think that cross-te ...
For there are some possibly thorny issues concerning how persons enjoy temporary properties that should be addressed. One versio ...
Or consider the version of endurantism defended by Doug Ehring (1997). On Ehring’s view, objects enjoy a changing series of temp ...
best thought of asfirst-order properties. For now, let us assume that they are. Examples of haecceities includebeing Kris McDani ...
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