PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: A contemporary introduction

242 NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS empiricists have officially treated them as trivial. The present chapter will be concerned with ...

ARGUMENTS (1) 243 simply ceasing to cause them to exist. Jainism embraces the former, more radical, dualism on which it is impos ...

244 NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS Substance dualism, and its associated view of persons, has a highly distinguished history. Plato ...

ARGUMENTS (1) 245 Full Qualitative Identity: X is fully qualitatively identical to Y if and only if for any quality Q, X has Q i ...

246 NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS Personal identity General criteria for theories of personal identity A theory of personal identi ...

ARGUMENTS (1) 247 at a later time is some relation R that holds between the bundles. There is a constraint on what relation R ca ...

248 NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS For Amy to perform some action at time T is for the bundle – the person(1) – that is Amy at time ...

ARGUMENTS (1) 249 7 It is not logically possible that the existence a moment from now of something just like me would prevent me ...

250 NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS nonendurers. These are single momentary constituents. There are composite nonendurers. These are ...

ARGUMENTS (1) 251 Of course, it is logically impossible that anyone ever satisfy the conditions laid down in (B1a) or (B2a). Thu ...

252 NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS 1 At T1, E1 is all there is of E. 2 At T2, E2 is all there is of E. 3 If 1 is true, then E1 is i ...

ARGUMENTS (1) 253 Account says makes successive bundles so related to be parts of the same person. The copy bears that relation ...

254 NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS to Tedward. So either Edward at T2 is not identical to Edward at T1 or Tedward is not identical ...

ARGUMENTS (1) 255 Since each bears relation R to Edward, any Complexity Account of Persons must answer affirmatively. Tedward is ...

256 NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS would not – that honor would be expected to go to the later Edward. In scenario four, one would ...

ARGUMENTS (1) 257 would exist at a given time a person perfectly resembling me prevents me from existing at that time. But while ...

258 NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS complexity theory takes to constitute being the same person) to Sam. Then we can say what we lik ...

ARGUMENTS (1) 259 A-in-W1 W1 is distinct from C-in-W1 and A-in-W2 is identical to C-in- W2; since C-in-W1 is identical to C-in-W ...

260 NONMONOTHEISTIC CONCEPTIONS The problem with this sort of argument is that, in each case, the italicized middle premise is f ...

ARGUMENTS (1) 261 2 If it is logically possible that Manindra is self-conscious and Manindra has no bodily states then Manindra’ ...